Corporate Governance in China: The Law and Its Political Logic

Routledge Handbook of Corporate Law ed. Roman Tomasic . (Abingdon: Routledge, November 2016), Chapter 11, pp. 183-211.

29 Pages Posted: 22 May 2017 Last revised: 12 Oct 2017

See all articles by Jiangyu Wang

Jiangyu Wang

City University of Hong Kong (CityU) - Centre for Chinese & Comparative Law

Date Written: October 19, 2016

Abstract

Although the formal structure of corporate governance in China bears some of the universal attributes, such as separate legal personality of the company and limited liability of shareholders, in response to the typical agency problems, corporate governance in China possesses also several "Chinese characteristics" resulted from China's rather unique political and economic system. It is fair to say the governance practice of Chinese enterprises is an evolving process the direction of which has been shaped by many factors. This chapter not only outlines the general allocation of corporate powers among various governance and management institutions in a company – including the shareholders' meeting, the board of directors, the supervisory board, and the management, but also place the legal framework of corporate governance in China in its political, economical and social contexts.

Keywords: Corporate law; corporate governance; China; state-owned enterprises; shareholder rights

JEL Classification: K2; G30

Suggested Citation

Wang, JiangYu, Corporate Governance in China: The Law and Its Political Logic (October 19, 2016). Routledge Handbook of Corporate Law ed. Roman Tomasic . (Abingdon: Routledge, November 2016), Chapter 11, pp. 183-211., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2970882

JiangYu Wang (Contact Author)

City University of Hong Kong (CityU) - Centre for Chinese & Comparative Law ( email )

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Room P5300, 5th Floor, Academic 1
Kowloon Tong
Hong Kong
34427026 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cityu.edu.hk/slw/people/people_wang_jiangyu.html

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