From Spontaneous Cooperation to Spontaneous Punishment – Distinguishing the Underlying Motives Driving Spontaneous Behavior in First and Second Order Public Goods

40 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2017

See all articles by Dorothee Mischkowski

Dorothee Mischkowski

Fernuniversität in Hagen - University of Hagen

Andreas Gloeckner

Fernuniversität in Hagen - University of Hagen

Peter G. Lewisch

University of Vienna - Faculty of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 5, 2017

Abstract

Recent findings indicate that at least some individuals use prosocial options by default in social dilemmas, known as ‘spontaneous cooperation’. In two studies, we test whether this effect generalizes to second order public goods in the form of punishment behavior in one-shot and iterated public good games, and investigate the underlying motivations. In line with spontaneous cooperation, punishment decreases with increasing decision time. Negative affect moderates this spontaneous punishment effect in one-shot public goods, in that punishment decisions are taken more quickly by persons who are more upset about the contribution behavior of their group members. Unlike spontaneous cooperation, spontaneous punishment is not driven by dispositional pro-sociality, but by above-average contributions. An overall analysis indicates a three-way interaction in that the spontaneous punishment effect is mainly valid for above-average, highly upset contributors. Our results highlight the uniqueness of spontaneous punishment, being in contrast to spontaneous cooperation independent of social preferences but similar to a revenge-orientated phenomenon.

Keywords: spontaneous cooperation, spontaneous punishment, decision time, second-party punishment, Social Value Orientation, above-average contributors, negative affect

Suggested Citation

Mischkowski, Dorothee and Gloeckner, Andreas and Lewisch, Peter G., From Spontaneous Cooperation to Spontaneous Punishment – Distinguishing the Underlying Motives Driving Spontaneous Behavior in First and Second Order Public Goods (July 5, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2997510 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2997510

Dorothee Mischkowski (Contact Author)

Fernuniversität in Hagen - University of Hagen ( email )

Universitätsstr. 27
Hagen, 58097
Germany

Andreas Gloeckner

Fernuniversität in Hagen - University of Hagen ( email )

Universitätsstr. 11 (TGZ)
Chair of Macroeconomics
58084 Hagen
Germany

Peter G. Lewisch

University of Vienna - Faculty of Law ( email )

Schottenbastei 10-16
Vienna, A-1010
Austria

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