The Political Economy of Global Constitutionalism

A. Lang and A. Wiender (eds), Handbook on Global Constitutionalism (Edward Elgar 2017)

29 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2016 Last revised: 7 Jun 2018

Date Written: June 2, 2016

Abstract

This chapter aims to draw attention to the political economy of the global constitutionalism debate. The relationship between the market and the state, the question of the distribution of wealth, and the prioritisation of certain market-related interests over others are raised as issues which concern global constitutionalism. I observe that the lack of outlets to ‘talk’ political economy tells us something about the naturalized assumptions in global constitutionalism. In particular, the division between the public and the private in constitutionalism is discussed as a means to silence important questions of political economy. Constitutionalism in this guise has historically ‘locked in’ neoliberalism (as argued by Stephan Gill) and has been a vehicle for imperialism and neocolonialism. Understood in this way, global constitutionalism has silenced neoliberal and neocolonial features. This implies that we should be concerned about a constitutionalized global economy. To test this thesis, I consider whether the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is symptomatic of a neoliberal and neocolonial global constitution.

Keywords: global constitutionalism, political economy, TTIP, neoliberalism, neocolonialism

Suggested Citation

Schwöbel-Patel, Christine, The Political Economy of Global Constitutionalism (June 2, 2016). A. Lang and A. Wiender (eds), Handbook on Global Constitutionalism (Edward Elgar 2017), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2863137 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2863137

Christine Schwöbel-Patel (Contact Author)

University of Warwick - School of Law ( email )

Gibbet Hill Road
Coventry CV4 7AL, CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/people?id=25504b090aaed74b111e4d096c3cf151%20

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