Download This PaperRoom Assignment-Rent Division: A Market Approach
25 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2002
Date Written: Februray 2002
Abstract
A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.
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