Do Volatility Extensions Improve the Quality of Closing Call Auctions?

Accepted for publication in the Financial Review

40 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2017 Last revised: 23 Apr 2021

See all articles by Ester Félez-Viñas

Ester Félez-Viñas

University of Technology Sydney; Digital Finance CRC

Björn Hagströmer

Stockholm University - Stockholm Business School

Date Written: January 2, 2021

Abstract

To improve the efficiency of the closing price, many equity exchanges apply volatility extensions to their closing call auctions. If an imminent auction execution implies a large price change, the order submission period is extended to let traders reconsider their orders. This paper uses the introduction of closing auction volatility extensions at NASDAQ Nordic to provide the first analysis of the effects of such mechanisms. We find that the volatility extensions reduce transitory volatility and deter price manipulation at the close. Consistent with increased trust in the mechanism, the closing call auction attracts higher volumes after the change.

Keywords: batch auction, auction safeguard, price manipulation, market integrity

JEL Classification: G14, G15, G18

Suggested Citation

Félez-Viñas, Ester and Hagströmer, Björn, Do Volatility Extensions Improve the Quality of Closing Call Auctions? (January 2, 2021). Accepted for publication in the Financial Review, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3062958 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3062958

Ester Félez-Viñas (Contact Author)

University of Technology Sydney ( email )

15 Broadway, Ultimo
PO Box 123
Sydney, NSW 2007
Australia

Digital Finance CRC ( email )

Björn Hagströmer

Stockholm University - Stockholm Business School ( email )

Stockholm
Sweden

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