Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters
48 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2017
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Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters
Number of pages: 48
Posted: 15 Nov 2017
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Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5849
Number of pages: 54
Posted: 04 May 2016
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104
Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters
CERGE-EI Working Paper Series No. 552
Number of pages: 55
Posted: 04 Nov 2015
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88
Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10888
Number of pages: 39
Posted: 20 Oct 2015
Date Written: September 1, 2017
Abstract
This paper studies how voters' selective ignorance interacts with policy design by political candidates. It shows that the selectivity empowers voters with extreme preferences and small groups, divisive issues attract most attention and public goods are underfunded. Finer granularity of information increases these inefficiencies. Rational inattention can also explain why competing candidates do not always converge on the same policy issues, and how the poor are politically empowered by welfare programs.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Matějka, Filip and Tabellini, Guido, Electoral Competition with Rationally Inattentive Voters (September 1, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3070204 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3070204
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