The Folly of Categorization: Why Nudges are Even More Defensible than Their Advocates Suppose
The Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 14, 2016
19 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2017
Date Written: December 3, 2016
Abstract
Count me among those philosophers who believe that most of the normative controversies about nudging or so-called libertarian paternalism are vastly overblown. I hope we are many, but it is hard to be sure. Nearly all of the worries brought against nudges qua nudges expressed by or attributed to moral philosophers are misdirected and/or exaggerated. My modest goal is to support this claim by attempting to show that Cass R. Sunstein—who almost certainly is the most well-known champion of nudges or libertarian paternalism—takes several of the philosophical objections to his proposals too seriously and responds to them less forcefully than he might.
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