Quantifying the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership

42 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2018

See all articles by Dan Ciuriak

Dan Ciuriak

Ciuriak Consulting Inc.; Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI); C.D. Howe Institute; Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada; BKP Development Research & Consulting GmbH

Jingliang Xiao

Infinite-Sum Modeling Inc.; Ciuriak Consulting Inc.

Ali Dadkhah

Ciuriak Consulting Inc.; Infinity Law

Date Written: December 30, 2017

Abstract

We assess the outcomes for the negotiating parties in the Trans-Pacific Partnership if the remaining eleven parties go ahead with the agreement as negotiated without the United States, as compared to the outcomes under the original twelve-member agreement signed in October 2016. We find that the eleven-party agreement, now renamed as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), is a much smaller deal than the twelve-party one, but that some parties do better without the United States in the deal, in particular those in the Western Hemisphere-Canada, Mexico, Chile, and Peru. For the politically relevant medium term, the United States stands to be less well-off outside the TPP than inside. Since provisional deals can be in place for a long time, the results of this study suggest that the eleven parties are better off to implement the CPTPP, leaving aside the controversial governance elements, the implications of which for national interests are unclear and which, in any event, may be substantially affected by parallel bilateral negotiations between individual CPTPP parties and the United States.

Keywords: Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP, CPTPP, United States, CGE Modelling

JEL Classification: F02, F13, F15

Suggested Citation

Ciuriak, Dan and Xiao, Jingliang and Dadkhah, Ali, Quantifying the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (December 30, 2017). East Asian Economic Review Vol. 21, No. 4 (December 2017) 343-384, doi/10.11644/KIEP.EAER.2017.21.4.334, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3100532 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3100532

Dan Ciuriak (Contact Author)

Ciuriak Consulting Inc. ( email )

83 Stewart St.
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6H9
Canada

Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) ( email )

57 Erb Street West
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2
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C.D. Howe Institute ( email )

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Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada ( email )

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BKP Development Research & Consulting GmbH ( email )

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Jingliang Xiao

Infinite-Sum Modeling Inc. ( email )

16167,Glenbrooks Pl
Vancouver, BC - British Columbia v4n1t3
Canada
6047245981 (Phone)
6047245981 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.infsum.com/en/

Ciuriak Consulting Inc. ( email )

83 Stewart St.
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6H9
Canada

Ali Dadkhah

Ciuriak Consulting Inc. ( email )

83 Stewart St.
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6H9
Canada

Infinity Law ( email )

200-931 Fort St.
Victoria, V8V 3K3
Canada

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