Juvenile Crime and Anticipated Punishment

Abstract

Are juvenile offenders deterred by criminal sanctions? Existing research indicates that they are not, as offending decreases only marginally when individuals cross the age of criminal majority and begin to face harsher, adult-level sanctions. Dynamic models of criminal behavior predict, however, that these small reactions close to the age threshold may mask larger responses away from, or in anticipation of, the age threshold. I use raise-the-age reforms in the United States to show that juvenile crime increases when the age of criminal majority is increased. As predicted by dynamic models of crime, these effects are driven by age groups well below the age of criminal majority. Further, the increase is driven by crime categories that are most likely to be related to street gangs as per the FBI's National Gang Report, consistent with a model of criminal capital accumulation. Alternative mechanisms like peer effects are discussed, but are not supported by the data. In sum, this paper focuses on crime as a dynamic process, and shows that offenders can respond in anticipation of increases in criminal sanctions. Accounting for these anticipatory responses can overturn the conclusion that harsh sanctions do not deter juvenile crime.

Keywords: Juvenile Delinquency, Juvenile Crime, Sanctions, General Deterrence

JEL Classification: K14, K42, J18, E22