Economic Policy, Complexity and International Capital Flows: The Unconstitutionality of Rent-Control Statutes; Multiple Listing Systems; and the Licensing of 'Real Estate Websites'

56 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2017 Last revised: 21 Jan 2018

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

Multiple Listing Systems (MLS), Real Estate Website (REW) Laws, and Rent-Control and Rent-Stabilization statutes (RCRS) are unconstitutional and affected the transmission of monetary policy and fiscal policies, and the rapid changes in housing prices and housing demand which occurred in the US and other countries between 1995 and 2010. MLS and REWs are fintech systems that are used around the world. There is an increasing and symbiotic relationship between the unconstitutionality and anti-competition effects of MLS, Real Estate Websites (REWs) and RCRS on one hand, and systemic risk and financial stability. MLS, Real Estate Websites (REWs) and RCRS can have substantial effects on consumer behavior in credit and asset markets – and this can precipitate structural changes in the financial services, real estate and retailing industries. Hence, all existing housing-demand models and housing price forecast models are grossly misspecified primarily because they don’t incorporate legal factors and associated economic effects.

Keywords: Monetary Policy; Systemic Risk; Financial Stability; Network Effects; Structural Changes; Antitrust; Fintech; Constitutional Political Economy; Asset Securitization; Asset Pricing; Consumer Behavior

Suggested Citation

Nwogugu, Michael C. I., Economic Policy, Complexity and International Capital Flows: The Unconstitutionality of Rent-Control Statutes; Multiple Listing Systems; and the Licensing of 'Real Estate Websites' (2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2937333 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2937333

Michael C. I. Nwogugu (Contact Author)

Independent ( email )

P. O. Box 11104
Enugu 400007, Enugu State 400007
Nigeria
2348149062100 (Phone)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
102
Abstract Views
782
Rank
472,796
PlumX Metrics