Administrative Injuries

59 Pages Posted: 8 May 2017 Last revised: 1 Mar 2019

See all articles by Matthew Stanford

Matthew Stanford

University of California, Berkeley - California Constitution Center

Date Written: May 3, 2017

Abstract

This Article seizes upon the precarious position of administrative agencies. As White House aides call for the “deconstruction of the administrative state” and judicial nominees flaunt their anti-Chevron credentials before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the thought of an impending test of New Deal reforms is no longer a matter of if, but when. This Article offers a new, more robust framework for courts to consider as litigants take aim at agencies’ adjudicative role. Specifically, it addresses the longstanding, yet incredibly porous doctrine of public rights and suggests that a modest analytical supplement––administrative injuries––would go a long way toward preserving this critical agency function while simultaneously harmonizing public rights with well-established Article III doctrines of justiciability. This Article seeks to make a useful, immediate contribution to academic and policy discussions, as well as the litigation strategies of those tasked with defending the adjudicative role of administrative agencies.

Keywords: Article III, public rights, administrative law, federal courts

Suggested Citation

Stanford, Matthew, Administrative Injuries (May 3, 2017). Florida State University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2963309 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2963309

Matthew Stanford (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - California Constitution Center ( email )

CA
United States

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