Misconduct and Leader Behaviour in Contests – New Evidence from European Football

Managerial and Decision Economics 40(5): 500-514, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3019

35 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2016 Last revised: 19 Sep 2022

See all articles by Karol Kempa

Karol Kempa

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

Hannes Rusch

Peter Löscher Chair of Business Ethics; Behavioral and Institutional Economics

Date Written: April 1, 2019

Abstract

This paper provides an empirical investigation of misconducts in contests based on data from European football. We extend previous studies by differentiating between dissents with the referee and misconducts directly aimed at sabotaging the competitor. We find that sabotage is more likely committed by teams with lower ability. Dissent is more likely to be shown by teams lagging behind in score and by away teams. We further find that captains engage more in sabotage during important matches and challenge referees' decisions immediately after sanctions of teammates. Finally, we also observe a deterrence effect of sanctions on all types of misconduct.

Keywords: Contest, Dissent, Leadership, Sabotage, Football

JEL Classification: D74, D91, M54, Z22.

Suggested Citation

Kempa, Karol and Rusch, Hannes and Rusch, Hannes, Misconduct and Leader Behaviour in Contests – New Evidence from European Football (April 1, 2019). Managerial and Decision Economics 40(5): 500-514, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808539 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2808539

Karol Kempa (Contact Author)

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management ( email )

Adickesallee 32-34
Frankfurt am Main, 60322
Germany

Hannes Rusch

Peter Löscher Chair of Business Ethics ( email )

Arcisstrasse 21
Munich, DE 80333
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.businessethics.edu.tum.de

Behavioral and Institutional Economics ( email )

Licher Strasse 66
Giessen, 35394
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://wiwi.uni-giessen.de

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