Pro Bono as a Human Capital Learning and Screening Mechanism: Evidence from Law Firms

Forthcoming, Strategic Management Journal

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-51

41 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2018

See all articles by Vanessa Burbano

Vanessa Burbano

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Management

John W Mamer

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)

Jason Snyder

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management

Date Written: May 1, 2018

Abstract

Inquiry into CSR as a human capital management tool has suggested that firms benefit from such activities because employees value the meaningfulness of these activities, which influences motivation and retention. We propose an alternate avenue through which firms can benefit from an important type of socially responsible activity – pro bono services – that does not require that employees derive utility from the meaningfulness of the activity. We propose that pro bono activities can benefit firms through human capital learning and screening mechanisms, given the stretch roles that pro bono engagements allow. We formalize this argument in the legal services industry, where we provide primary evidence, a formal model, and empirical results using a panel dataset of the top 200 law firms to support this argument.

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Human Capital Strategy, Promotions, Organizations, Legal Services

Suggested Citation

Burbano, Vanessa and Mamer, John W and Snyder, Jason, Pro Bono as a Human Capital Learning and Screening Mechanism: Evidence from Law Firms (May 1, 2018). Forthcoming, Strategic Management Journal, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-51, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3187639

Vanessa Burbano (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Management ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

John W Mamer

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) ( email )

405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 951361
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States

Jason Snyder

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

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