Initial Coin Offerings and the Value of Crypto Tokens

37 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2018 Last revised: 7 Mar 2019

See all articles by Christian Catalini

Christian Catalini

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Diem Association and Diem Networks US; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Joshua S. Gans

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; NBER

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 5, 2019

Abstract

This paper explores how entrepreneurs can use initial coin offerings - whereby they issue crypto tokens and commit to only accept those tokens as payment for their products - to fund venture start-up costs. We show that the ICO mechanism allows entrepreneurs to generate buyer competition for the token, giving it value. We also find that venture returns are independent of any committed growth in the supply of tokens over time, but that initial funds raised are maximized by setting that growth to zero to encourage saving by early participants. Nonetheless, since the value of the tokens depends on a single period of demand, the ability to raise funds is more limited than in traditional equity finance. Furthermore, a lack of commitment in monetary policy undermines saving behavior, hence the cost of using tokens to fund start-up costs is inflexibility in future capital raises. Crypto tokens can also facilitate coordination among stakeholders within digital ecosystems when network effects are present.

Keywords: crypto tokens, blockchain, cryptocurrency, initial coin offering, entrepreneurial finance, crowdfunding, equity financing, monetary policy, network effects.

JEL Classification: E42, L12, L26

Suggested Citation

Catalini, Christian and Gans, Joshua S., Initial Coin Offerings and the Value of Crypto Tokens (March 5, 2019). MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5347-18, Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 3137213, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3137213 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3137213

Christian Catalini (Contact Author)

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Diem Association and Diem Networks US ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Joshua S. Gans

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

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