Ordinally Symmetric Games
Operations Research Letters, Forthcoming
9 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2018 Last revised: 25 Jan 2019
Date Written: July 2, 2018
Abstract
We extend the notion of an ordinally symmetric game of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) from two to n players. We prove that each ordinally symmetric game with two strategies is an ordinal potential game and thus possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, generalizing a result of Hofbauer and Sorger (2002) on symmetric games.
Keywords: Symmetric Games, Ordinally Symmetric Games, Potential Games
JEL Classification: C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Cao, Zhigang and Yang, Xiaoguang, Ordinally Symmetric Games (July 2, 2018). Operations Research Letters, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3206379 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3206379
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.