Transparency and Market Discipline: Evidence from the Russian Interbank Market

32 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2018

See all articles by François Guillemin

François Guillemin

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Maria Semenova

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Date Written: August 2, 2018

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of bank voluntary disclosure, as a source of information about risk, in the interbank market. Using data on the 179 largest Russian banks over the period of 2004-2013 we test whether the ability to attract interbank loans is sensitive to various transparency indices such as those disclosing bank risks, board composition, or even corporate event details. We show that larger but riskier banks – at least in terms of credit risk – behave more transparently and disclose more. The article is also the first to provide evidence that the ability to attract funds in the interbank market is positively correlated with the degree of transparency. This result is stable for various aspects of disclosure.

Keywords: banks, interbank market, disclosure, transparency, banking governance

JEL Classification: G21, P2

Suggested Citation

Guillemin, François and Semenova, Maria, Transparency and Market Discipline: Evidence from the Russian Interbank Market (August 2, 2018). Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 67/FE/2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3225061 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3225061

François Guillemin (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow) ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Maria Semenova

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow) ( email )

Pokrоvsky blvd, 11
Moscow, Moscow 101000
Russia

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