Litigation Migrants

44 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2018

See all articles by Charlotte Alexander

Charlotte Alexander

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2018

Abstract

Civil law is enforced primarily via private litigation. One characteristic of private enforcement is that litigation levels tend to cycle between booms and busts. This Article builds a theory for explaining this fluctuation, proposing that plaintiffs' attorneys can be understood as economic migrants. Just as workers cross borders to find jobs, lawyers "move" across case types and jurisdictions to find profitable claims, and case-filing numbers increase as a result. Using the recent wage and hour litigation boom as a case study, this Article paints an empirical picture of attorney migration and its influence on case filing numbers. Drawing on these analyses, the Article concludes by considering the optimal litigation level within our private enforcement system.

Keywords: employment law, empirical legal studies, civil litigation, private litigation, private enforcement, wage and hour litigation

JEL Classification: K19, K39, K40

Suggested Citation

Alexander, Charlotte, Litigation Migrants (2018). Georgia State University College of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3230195

Charlotte Alexander (Contact Author)

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business ( email )

800 West Peachtree St.
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States

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