Electoral Outcomes, Economic Expectations and the 'Ethic of Self-Reliance'

Carnegie Mellon Behavioral Decision Research Working Paper No. 306

31 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2002

See all articles by Garrett Glasgow

Garrett Glasgow

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Political Science

Roberto A. Weber

University of Zurich - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: July 30, 2002

Abstract

This paper examines how election outcomes affect individual economic expectations. In particular, we are interested in how differences in economic individualism change the relationship between election outcomes and individual expectations for personal economic well-being. We hypothesize that economic individualists will not link electoral outcomes to expectations for their personal economic well-being, while individuals who are not economic individualists will link the two. We confirm this hypothesis empirically using a postelection survey from the 1994 German Bundestag election.

Keywords: individual economic expectations, economic individualism, German elections

JEL Classification: D72, D84

Suggested Citation

Glasgow, Garrett and Weber, Roberto A., Electoral Outcomes, Economic Expectations and the 'Ethic of Self-Reliance' (July 30, 2002). Carnegie Mellon Behavioral Decision Research Working Paper No. 306, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=323441 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.323441

Garrett Glasgow

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Dept. of Political Science
University of California
Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9420
United States

Roberto A. Weber (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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