Not all Group Members are created Equal: Heterogeneous Abilities in Inter-group Contests

Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER) Working Paper Series 2018-14

44 Pages Posted: 7 Nov 2018

See all articles by Francesco Fallucchi

Francesco Fallucchi

University of Bergamo; LISER

Enrique Fatas

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS); University of Valencia - LINEEX

Felix Kölle

University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Ori Weisel

University of Nottingham; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics

Date Written: September 11, 2018

Abstract

Competition between groups is ubiquitous in social and economic life, and groups are typically not created equal. Here we experimentally investigate the implications of this general observation on the unfolding of symmetric and asymmetric competition between groups that are either homogeneous or heterogeneous in the ability of their members to contribute to the success of the group. Our main finding is that, in contrast with a number of theoretical predictions, efforts in contests involving heterogeneous groups are higher than in contests involving only homogeneous groups, leading to reduced earnings (to contest participants) and increased inequality. This effect is particularly pronounced in asymmetric contests, where both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups increase their efforts. We find that asymmetry between groups changes the way group members condition their efforts on those of their peers. Implications for contest designers are discussed.

Keywords: contests, groups, abilities, heterogeneity, experiments

JEL Classification: C72, C92, D72, H40

Suggested Citation

Fallucchi, Francesco and Fatas, Enrique and Kölle, Felix and Weisel, Ori, Not all Group Members are created Equal: Heterogeneous Abilities in Inter-group Contests (September 11, 2018). Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER) Working Paper Series 2018-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266558 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3266558

Francesco Fallucchi (Contact Author)

University of Bergamo ( email )

Via Salvecchio, 19
Bergamo, 24129
Italy

LISER ( email )

11, Porte des Sciences
Campus Belval – Maison des Sciences Humaines
Esch-sur-Alzette, L-4366
Luxembourg

Enrique Fatas

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) ( email )

United Kingdom

University of Valencia - LINEEX ( email )

Campus Tarongers
E-46022 Valencia
Spain
+34.963.828.643 (Phone)
+963.828.415 (Fax)

Felix Kölle

University of Cologne - Department of Economics ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://felixkoelle.weebly.com/

Ori Weisel

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

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