Cooperation in Social Dilemmas Through Position Uncertainty

The Economic Journal, Volume 129, Issue 621, July 2019, Pages 2137–2154

25 Pages Posted: 6 May 2017 Last revised: 15 Jul 2019

See all articles by Andrea Gallice

Andrea Gallice

University of Torino and Collegio Carlo Alberto

Ignacio Monzón

University of Turin - Collegio Carlo Alberto

Date Written: July 15, 2018

Abstract

We present a natural environment that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the sequence, but observe the actions of some predecessors. Since agents realize that their own action may be observed, they have an incentive to contribute in order to induce potential successors to also do so. Full contribution can then emerge in equilibrium. The same environment leads to full cooperation in the prisoners’ dilemma.

Keywords: Social Dilemmas, Public Goods, Position Uncertainty, Voluntary Contributions, Fundraising

JEL Classification: C72, D82, H41

Suggested Citation

Gallice, Andrea and Monzón, Ignacio, Cooperation in Social Dilemmas Through Position Uncertainty (July 15, 2018). The Economic Journal, Volume 129, Issue 621, July 2019, Pages 2137–2154, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2963599 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2963599

Andrea Gallice

University of Torino and Collegio Carlo Alberto ( email )

Corso Unione Sovietica 218bis
Torino, Torino 10134
Italy

Ignacio Monzón (Contact Author)

University of Turin - Collegio Carlo Alberto ( email )

Piazza Vincenzo Arbarello, 8
Torino, 10122
Italy

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