Local Government Behavior and Property Rights Formation in Rural China

UC Davis Working Paper No. 02-004

43 Pages Posted: 4 Apr 2003

See all articles by Loren Brandt

Loren Brandt

University of Toronto - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Scott Rozelle

University of California, Davis - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Matthew Turner

University of Toronto

Date Written: 2002

Abstract

We examine the ongoing transition from centrally planned to market agriculture in rural China. In particular, we examine the devolution of land rights from village governments to villagers and the corresponding evolution of tenure security in agricultural land. We find econometric support for the statistical and economic importance of four explanations for local government behavior. Three of these explanations indicate a link between the incentives and constraints faced by village leaders and property rights in agricultural land, and hence suggest policy levers to encourage more secure property rights.

Keywords: devolution of land rights, evolution of tenure security, local government behavior

JEL Classification: R52, Q13

Suggested Citation

Brandt, Loren and Rozelle, Scott and Turner, Matthew A., Local Government Behavior and Property Rights Formation in Rural China (2002). UC Davis Working Paper No. 02-004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=330241 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.330241

Loren Brandt

University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )

150 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G7
Canada
416-978-4442 (Phone)
416-978-6713 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Scott Rozelle (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics ( email )

One Shields Avenue
Davis, CA 95616
United States
530-752-9897 (Phone)

Matthew A. Turner

University of Toronto ( email )

Department of Economics
150 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G7
Canada

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