Bank Resolution and Public Backstop in an Asymmetric Banking Union

57 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2018 Last revised: 28 Aug 2023

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 25, 2023

Abstract

We characterize the optimal banking union with endogenous participation in a two-country economy in which domestic bank failures may be contemporaneous to sovereign crises, giving rise to risk-sharing motives to mutualize the funding of bailouts. Bank bail-ins create disruption costs that are private information of domestic authorities. We find that when country asymmetry is large, resolution policies are ex-post inefficient: They exhibit reduced contributions to the public backstop by the fiscally stronger country, lead to more bailouts and forbearance in early bank intervention in that country, and may render the weaker country a net contributor of funds within the union.

Keywords: Banking Union, Bail-In, Bailout, Public Backstop, Mechanism Design

JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Segura, Anatoli and Vicente, Sergio, Bank Resolution and Public Backstop in an Asymmetric Banking Union (August 25, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3133040 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3133040

Anatoli Segura (Contact Author)

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

Sergio Vicente

University of Luxembourg ( email )

L-1511 Luxembourg
Luxembourg

HOME PAGE: http://www.sergiovicente.com

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