The Reciprocity Set
44 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2019 Last revised: 2 Oct 2023
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The Reciprocity Set
The Reciprocity Set
Date Written: February 8, 2020
Abstract
We study procedures that embed clauses granting agents the right to oppose actions that are not in their interest, retract actions that face opposition, and punish harmful actions. Our analyses show that coalitional farsighted behaviors under these procedures lead to reciprocal actions. We then introduce a solution concept--\textit{the reciprocity set}--to predict stable outcomes for effectivity function games. We find that under mild conditions, the reciprocity set (1) is always non-empty; (2) only selects efficient outcomes; (3) strategically protects minority outcomes; and (4) is compatible with classical notions of fairness and Rawlsian justice in distributive problems.
Keywords: Reciprocity Set, Pareto-efficiency, Minority, Fairness, Effectivity Functions
JEL Classification: P16, D72, C7, J15, H41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation