In-Network Auditors and Foreign Subsidiaries’ Investment Efficiency

36 Pages Posted: 13 May 2019 Last revised: 16 Jan 2024

See all articles by Eva Labro

Eva Labro

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Accounting Area

Jochen Pierk

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Christophe Van Linden

Oslo Metropolitan University

Date Written: January 8, 2024

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of appointing in-network auditors (i.e., audit firms from the same global audit firm network) in business groups on the investment efficiency of subsidiaries. We use a sample of European business groups for which we observe the parent and both domestic and foreign subsidiaries. Our findings reveal that an audit by in-network auditors does not affect the investment efficiency of domestic subsidiaries but leads to improvements in the investment efficiency of foreign subsidiaries. Specifically, external audits by in-network auditors are associated with a reduced likelihood and reduced extent of over-investments by foreign subsidiaries. While prior research mostly focuses on the role of auditors in providing financial reporting assurance within business groups, our study shows that in-network auditors provide audits with more added value by enhancing subsidiary investment efficiency.

Keywords: group audit, auditor alignment, interface between auditing and managerial accounting, internal information quality, common auditor

JEL Classification: M41, M42

Suggested Citation

Labro, Eva and Pierk, Jochen and Van Linden, Christophe, In-Network Auditors and Foreign Subsidiaries’ Investment Efficiency (January 8, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3370953 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3370953

Eva Labro

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Accounting Area ( email )

McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States
(919) 962-5747 (Phone)

Jochen Pierk (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

Christophe Van Linden

Oslo Metropolitan University ( email )

Pilestredet 35
Oslo, 0167
Norway

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