How Do Investors Perceive Corporate General Counsel? The Role of Monitoring and Advising Demand

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Forthcoming

2019 Canadian Academic Accounting Association (CAAA) Annual Conference

52 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2019 Last revised: 9 Jan 2024

See all articles by Zhihong Chen

Zhihong Chen

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Yun Ke

University of Texas at El Paso - Department of Accounting & Information Systems

Ke Wang

University of Alberta - School of Business

Date Written: December 21, 2023

Abstract

We find that firms with a general counsel (GC) in top management (GC firms) have a higher ex-ante cost of equity implied in stock prices and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Lead-lag changes analysis shows that the cost of equity increases after, but not before, the appointment of GCs to top management. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that the cost of equity difference between GC and non-GC firms and the cost of equity increase following the appointment of GCs to top management are more pronounced for firms with greater monitoring demand and less pronounced for firms with greater advising demand. We also observe negative market reactions to proxy statements that reveal the appointment of a GC to top management. Finally, our falsification tests find no evidence that investors react to the addition of Chief Marketing Officers, Chief Operating Officers, or Chief Financial Officers to top management. Overall, our results suggest that investors’ perceptions of including GCs in top management depend on the firm’s demand for monitoring and advising.

Keywords: cost of equity, general counsel, monitoring demand, advising demand

JEL Classification: G12, K00, G34, G32, M41

Suggested Citation

Chen, Zhihong and Ke, Yun and Wang, Ke, How Do Investors Perceive Corporate General Counsel? The Role of Monitoring and Advising Demand (December 21, 2023). Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Forthcoming, 2019 Canadian Academic Accounting Association (CAAA) Annual Conference, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3318462

Zhihong Chen

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology ( email )

Clear Water Bay
Kowloon
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
(852)-2358-7574 (Phone)
(852)-2358-1693 (Fax)

Yun Ke

University of Texas at El Paso - Department of Accounting & Information Systems ( email )

University Library - Acquisitions Department
500 West University Avenue
El Paso, TX 79968
United States

Ke Wang (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - School of Business ( email )

3-23 Business Building
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
+1 780-492-1630 (Phone)

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