Trans-Tasman Cooperation in Banking Supervision and Resolution

Journal of Banking Regulation, 21(1), 15-25.

21 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2019 Last revised: 8 Mar 2020

See all articles by Dirk Schoenmaker

Dirk Schoenmaker

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: March 7, 2020

Abstract

Four major Australian banks span the Australian and New Zealand banking system. Applying the financial trilemma model, this article investigates possible approaches for cooperation in the supervision and resolution of these cross-border banks. The article first reviews the current arrangement in the Trans-Tasman Council of Banking Supervision, which is based on a soft law approach. Next, this article explores a trans-Tasman banking union, which would encompass joint supervision and joint resolution based on burden sharing. The challenge is political. Are the two countries willing to join forces in banking policies and thus give up part of their sovereignty in this field? And can New Zealand, as the smaller one of the two, ensure an effective voice in joint arrangements?

Keywords: International Banks, Banking Supervision, Burden Sharing, Resolution Planning

JEL Classification: F30, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Schoenmaker, Dirk, Trans-Tasman Cooperation in Banking Supervision and Resolution (March 7, 2020). Journal of Banking Regulation, 21(1), 15-25., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405262 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3405262

Dirk Schoenmaker (Contact Author)

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.rsm.nl/people/dirk-schoenmaker/

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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