Technological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization

36 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2019

See all articles by Pau Balart

Pau Balart

Universitat de les Illes Balears

Agustin Casas

Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) - Colegio Universitario de Estudios Financieros (CUNEF); Northwestern University

Orestis Troumpounis

Università di Padova; Lancaster University - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 19, 2018

Abstract

We focus on changes in technology and campaign management to study the documented simultaneous increase in campaign spending and polarization. In our model, some voters are ideological while others are impressionable. If the distribution of voters between types is endogenous and depends on parties' platform choices, our results show that a) an increase in the effectiveness of electoral advertising or a decrease in the electorate's political awareness, surely increases polarization and may also increase campaign spending, while b) a decrease in the cost of advertising does not affect neither polarization nor spending.

Keywords: electoral competition, campaign spending, impressionable voters, semiorder lexicographic preferences

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Balart, Pau and Casas, Agustin and Troumpounis, Orestis, Technological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization (November 19, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3419670 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3419670

Pau Balart (Contact Author)

Universitat de les Illes Balears ( email )

Carretera de Valldemossa km7.5
Palma, 07122
Spain

Agustin Casas

Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) - Colegio Universitario de Estudios Financieros (CUNEF) ( email )

Serrano Anguita 9
Madrid, Madrid 28004
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/agustincasas/

Northwestern University ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Orestis Troumpounis

Università di Padova ( email )

Lancaster University - Department of Economics ( email )

Lancaster LA1 4YX, LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

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