Fairness Concerns and Job Assignment to Positions with Different Surplus

33 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2019 Last revised: 29 Sep 2021

See all articles by Katarína Danková

Katarína Danková

University of East Anglia (UEA)

Hodaka Morita

Hitotsubashi University - Institute of Economic Research

Maroš Servátka

Macquarie Graduate School of Management - MGSM Experimental Economics Laboratory

Le Zhang

Macquarie University - Macquarie Graduate School of Management; Macquarie University, Macquarie Business School

Date Written: September 30, 2021

Abstract

How does job assignment to positions with different surplus affect fairness concerns? We experimentally examine agents’ fairness concerns in a three-person ultimatum game in which all agents are asked to complete a general knowledge quiz before being assigned to a high-stake or low-stake position. We disentangle two possible channels through which job assignment impacts fairness concerns, wage differences and the principal’s intentions, by comparing cases in which the job assignment is determined randomly or by the principal. The knowledge quiz, which mimics performance evaluation, signifies the distinction between the two cases as it provides a basis on which the principal can make the assignment decision. We find that the principal’s intentions significantly impact fairness concerns of the agents assigned to the low-stake position, but wage differences themselves do not. We elaborate on managerial implications of our findings.

Keywords: job assignment, fairness concerns, experiment, ultimatum game, wage differences, intentions

JEL Classification: C91, C92, J31, J71, M12

Suggested Citation

Danková, Katarína and Morita, Hodaka and Servátka, Maroš and Zhang, Le and Zhang, Le, Fairness Concerns and Job Assignment to Positions with Different Surplus (September 30, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3449092 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3449092

Katarína Danková

University of East Anglia (UEA) ( email )

Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom

Hodaka Morita

Hitotsubashi University - Institute of Economic Research ( email )

2-1 Naka Kunitachi-shi
Tokyo 186-8306
Japan

Maroš Servátka (Contact Author)

Macquarie Graduate School of Management - MGSM Experimental Economics Laboratory ( email )

Sydney
Australia

Le Zhang

Macquarie University - Macquarie Graduate School of Management ( email )

Macquarie University, Macquarie Business School ( email )

Room 414, 4 Eastern Road, Macquarie Business Schoo
Macquarie University, 2109
Australia
0430768699 (Phone)

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