The Links Between Fiscal Federalism, Political Alignment and Elections

15 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2019

See all articles by Marcelo Castro

Marcelo Castro

Universidade Federal de Uberlandia

Tiago Cisalpino

Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) - Cedeplar

Date Written: November 3, 2019

Abstract

Does economic dependence of small towns on federal grants lead to electoral support? To answer this question, we use an exogenous rule of distribution to estimate the effects of the main federal transfer to Brazilian small towns on the results of elections throughout 20 years, when two rival parties succeeded in power. We find that more dependence on unconditional grants benefits the central government party, whereas the main opposition party loses votes in races to president and National Congress. The hypothesis is that enforcing economic dependence of small towns on the central government's unconditional grants can be a channel of political alignment - they need federal deputies aligned to the federal government to ask for budget amendments. On the other hand, larger cities can be a resilient place of opposition, once the size of government is smaller and where average income fluctuates more, especially in periods of low economic growth.

Keywords: Size of local governments, Fiscal Federalism, Political Alignment

JEL Classification: H11, H72, H77 D72

Suggested Citation

Castro, Marcelo and Cisalpino, Tiago, The Links Between Fiscal Federalism, Political Alignment and Elections (November 3, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477296 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3477296

Marcelo Castro (Contact Author)

Universidade Federal de Uberlandia ( email )

Av. Pará 1720 Bloco 2C Sala 34
Uberlandia, Minas Gerais 38400902
Brazil

Tiago Cisalpino

Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) - Cedeplar ( email )

Rua Curitiba, 832, 9 andar
Belo Horizonte
30170-120 Minas Gerais
Brazil

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