International Arbitration and Domestic Antitrust: Natural Progression or Random Alliance?

Competition Policy International (CPI) Antitrust Chronicle – Arbitration & Antitrust, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2019, pp. 33-39

8 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2019 Last revised: 8 Nov 2019

See all articles by Vera Korzun

Vera Korzun

University of Akron School of Law

Date Written: July 9, 2019

Abstract

National courts and arbitration laws around the globe have long proclaimed that antitrust claims are arbitrable, that is they can be submitted to and resolved in arbitration. The number of antitrust arbitrations has reportedly grown in recent years, providing a feasible route for private enforcement of antitrust laws. This article focuses on arbitration of domestic antitrust claims in international commercial arbitration — arbitration that may arise from international business transactions. Apart from antitrust claims and defenses, the article explores how parties in international arbitration invoke antitrust to challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction and arbitral awards in setting aside and enforcement proceedings. It also explores the issue of multiplicity of antitrust laws in international arbitration and how arbitral tribunals can address it. It concludes by analyzing the role of arbitrators and supervisory courts in the enforcement of antitrust laws, and the nature of the relationship between domestic antitrust and international arbitration.

Keywords: international arbitration, antitrust, competition, European Union

JEL Classification: K21, K33

Suggested Citation

Korzun, Vera, International Arbitration and Domestic Antitrust: Natural Progression or Random Alliance? (July 9, 2019). Competition Policy International (CPI) Antitrust Chronicle – Arbitration & Antitrust, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2019, pp. 33-39, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3443980

Vera Korzun (Contact Author)

University of Akron School of Law ( email )

150 University Ave.
Akron, OH 44325-2901
United States

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