Location, Taxation, and Governments: An Exchange Theory of Intellectual Property

42 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2019

See all articles by Sinclair Davidson

Sinclair Davidson

RMIT University

Vijay Mohan

Independent

Jason Potts

Royal Melbourne Institute of Technolog (RMIT University)

Date Written: November 13, 2019

Abstract

The standard economic model of intellectual property is an efficient property rights solution to a market failure problem of investment in a non-rival and non-excludable good. We propose a new ‘stationary bandit’ model of intellectual property based on a contracting approach in the context of market-making and enforcement of economic rights in exchange for monopoly taxation rights. We use a formal Hotelling type model to show the relationship between location and pricing decisions of innovating firms under differing intellectual property regimes, institutional quality, and taxation.

Keywords: intellectual property, stationary bandit model, institutional quality, tax havens, tax competition, strategic trade policy

JEL Classification: D02, O34, D72, F51, F55, F61, H71, H87, K3

Suggested Citation

Davidson, Sinclair and Mohan, Vijay and Potts, Jason, Location, Taxation, and Governments: An Exchange Theory of Intellectual Property (November 13, 2019). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3486556

Sinclair Davidson

RMIT University ( email )

124 La Trobe Street
Melbourne, 3000
Australia

Vijay Mohan

Independent ( email )

Australia

Jason Potts (Contact Author)

Royal Melbourne Institute of Technolog (RMIT University) ( email )

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