Earnings Management and Stock Price Crashes Post U.S. Cross-Delistings

Abstract

We examine whether cross-delisted firms from the major U.S. stock exchanges experience an increase in crash risk associated with earnings management. Consistent with our prediction, we find that earnings management has a greater positive impact on stock price crash risk post cross-delisting when compared to a control group of firms that remain cross-listed. More importantly, we find that this effect is more pronounced for cross-delisted firms from countries with weaker investor protection, poorer quality of their information environment and less conservative accounting practices. Our findings are robust to the potential endogenous nature of the cross-delisting decision, alternative measures of stock price crash risk and information asymmetry. We interpret our results as evidence of a “reverse bonding effect” following cross-delistings from U.S. stock exchanges.

Keywords: Cross-Delisting, U.S. Stock Exchange, Stock Price Crash Risk, Accruals Earnings Management, Real Earnings Management, Information Asymmetry, Bonding Hypothesis, Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, Information Environment, Earnings Conservatism

JEL Classification: F30, F31, G15, G30