A Wig for Arbitrators: What Does it Add?

19 Pages Posted: 28 Jun 2019 Last revised: 5 Dec 2019

See all articles by Thomas Schultz

Thomas Schultz

King's College London

Clément Bachmann

University of Geneva; Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) - Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement (CIDS)

Date Written: June 17, 2019

Abstract

This essay (meant for a forthcoming and at this stage undisclosed Festschrift) sketches a preliminary examination of the type of social order that hybrid international commercial courts might contribute to creating or sustaining. It starts by reviewing the arguments advanced, implicitly or expressly, in favour of the development of these hybrid courts. These revolve, it finds, around signalling the return of the state and the figure of the judge in the world of private international dispute resolution, which comes with likely expectations of better societal representation and greater consideration of common state interests, and around mobilizing the ameliorating invisible hand of competition on the dispute resolution market. The essay then critical considers these arguments and assesses other likely societal effects of these courts. It suggests that hybrid courts offer new opportunities to the privileged few and may thus contribute to increasing social inequalities, and that nothing currently indicates that hybrid court judges will be more representative than the existing pool of international arbitrators. In the end, the essay argues that the development of hybrid commercial courts, meant to allow private dispute resolution to expand its markets, may backfire, further fuelling the current pushback against privatized dispute resolution.

Keywords: hybrid commercial courts, arbitration, judges, social representation, social inequalities, market of dispute resolution

Suggested Citation

Schultz, Thomas and Bachmann, Clément, A Wig for Arbitrators: What Does it Add? (June 17, 2019). King's College London Law School Research Paper No. 2019-33, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405350 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3405350

Thomas Schultz (Contact Author)

King's College London ( email )

Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

Clément Bachmann

University of Geneva ( email )

102 Bd Carl-Vogt
Geneva
Switzerland

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) - Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement (CIDS) ( email )

Villa Moynier
Rue de Lausanne 120b
Geneva, 12011
Switzerland

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