On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities

43 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2020

See all articles by Idione Meneghel

Idione Meneghel

Australian National University (ANU)

Rabee Tourky

Australian National University (ANU) - Research School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 14, 2020

Abstract

This paper presents new results on the existence of pure-strategy Bayesian equilibria in specified functional forms. These results broaden the scope of methods developed by Reny (2011) well beyond monotone pure strategies. Applications include natural models of first-price and all-pay auctions not covered by previous existence results. To illustrate the scope of our results, we provide an analysis of three auctions: (i) a first-price auction of objects that are heterogeneous and imperfect substitutes; (ii) a first-price auction in which bidders’ payoffs have a very general interdependence structure; and (iii) an all-pay auction with non-monotone equilibrium.

Keywords: Bayesian games, Monotone strategies, Pure-strategy equilibrium, Auctions

JEL Classification: C72, D44

Suggested Citation

Meneghel, Idione and Tourky, Rabee, On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities (March 14, 2020). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2190R2, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3555916 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3555916

Idione Meneghel (Contact Author)

Australian National University (ANU) ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 2601
Australia

Rabee Tourky

Australian National University (ANU) - Research School of Economics ( email )

Canberra
Australia

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
39
Abstract Views
392
PlumX Metrics