On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities
43 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2020
There are 4 versions of this paper
On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities
On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities
On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities
On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities
Date Written: March 14, 2020
Abstract
This paper presents new results on the existence of pure-strategy Bayesian equilibria in specified functional forms. These results broaden the scope of methods developed by Reny (2011) well beyond monotone pure strategies. Applications include natural models of first-price and all-pay auctions not covered by previous existence results. To illustrate the scope of our results, we provide an analysis of three auctions: (i) a first-price auction of objects that are heterogeneous and imperfect substitutes; (ii) a first-price auction in which bidders’ payoffs have a very general interdependence structure; and (iii) an all-pay auction with non-monotone equilibrium.
Keywords: Bayesian games, Monotone strategies, Pure-strategy equilibrium, Auctions
JEL Classification: C72, D44
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation