Information Aggregation with Runoff Voting

53 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2019 Last revised: 21 Apr 2020

See all articles by Nikolas Tsakas

Nikolas Tsakas

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus

Date Written: April 20, 2020

Abstract

A majority of truth-seeking voters wants to choose the alternative that better matches the state of the world, but may disagree on its identity due to private information. When we have an arbitrary number of alternatives and also sophisticated partisan voters exist in the electorate, the election of the correct alternative is a real challenge. We show that multi-round runoff voting achieves asymptotically full-information equivalence. That is, when the society is large, it can lead to the election of the correct alternative under fairly general assumptions regarding the information structure and partisans' preferences.

Keywords: runoff voting, information aggregation, partisan voters, Condorcet jury theorem

JEL Classification: D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Tsakas, Nikolas and Xefteris, Dimitrios, Information Aggregation with Runoff Voting (April 20, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3394890 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3394890

Nikolas Tsakas (Contact Author)

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

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