Who Isn’t Running American Government: Appointee Vacancies in U.S. Executive Branch Agencies

Journal of Public Policy, Forthcoming

50 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2019 Last revised: 29 Apr 2020

See all articles by William G. Resh

William G. Resh

University of Southern California- Sol Price School of Public Policy

Gary Hollibaugh

University of Notre Dame - Department of Political Science

Patrick Roberts

Virginia Tech - Center for Public Administration and Policy

Matthew M. Dull

Virginia Tech

Date Written: March 6, 2020

Abstract

We analyze presidential appointee positions subject to Senate-confirmation (PAS) without a confirmed appointee in office. These “vacant” positions are byproducts of American constitutional design, shaped by the interplay of institutional politics. Using a novel data-set, we analyze PAS vacancies across executive branch departments and single-headed agencies between January 1989 and January 2013. We develop a theoretical model in order to uncover the dynamics of vacancy onset and length. We then specify an empirical model and report results highlighting both position and principal-agent relations as critical to the politics of appointee vacancies. We find high-status PAS positions reduce the frequency and duration of vacancies. However, conditional on this and consistent with our theoretical model, we also find important principal-agent considerations from a separation of powers perspective, as vacant PAS positions in agencies ideologically divergent to the Senate majority are vacant for less time than in ideologically congruent agencies.

Keywords: Presidential Appointments, Senate, Vacancies

JEL Classification: J45

Suggested Citation

Resh, William G. and Hollibaugh, Gary and Roberts, Patrick and Dull, Matthew M., Who Isn’t Running American Government: Appointee Vacancies in U.S. Executive Branch Agencies (March 6, 2020). Journal of Public Policy, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3310806 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3310806

William G. Resh (Contact Author)

University of Southern California- Sol Price School of Public Policy ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90089-0626
United States

HOME PAGE: http://priceschool.usc.edu/william-g-resh/

Gary Hollibaugh

University of Notre Dame - Department of Political Science ( email )

2060 Jenkins Nanovic Halls
Notre Dame, IN 46556
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.garyhollibaugh.com

Patrick Roberts

Virginia Tech - Center for Public Administration and Policy ( email )

104 Draper Road (0520)
Blacksburg, VA 24061
United States

Matthew M. Dull

Virginia Tech ( email )

250 Drillfield Drive
Blacksburg, VA 24061
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
155
Abstract Views
959
Rank
343,436
PlumX Metrics