Legal Origins, Religion and Health Outcomes: A Cross-Country Comparison of Organ Donation Laws

13 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2018 Last revised: 5 Jun 2020

See all articles by Guillem Riambau

Guillem Riambau

Universitat de Barcelona; University of Barcelona - Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)

Clin Lai

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Yale-NUS College

Boyu Lu Zhao

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Yale-NUS College

Jean Liu

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Yale-NUS College

Date Written: June 5, 2020

Abstract

This paper investigates what drives countries to legislate presumed consent ---making citizens organ donors by default unless they opt out--- instead of explicit consent. Results reveal the following: First, civil law predicts presumed consent, which uncovers a mechanism by which an institution that long pre-dates transplantation medicine has an impact on current health outcomes. This is in line with previous research that has found that civil law regimes tend to be more comfortable with a centralized and activist government than common law ones. Second, Catholicism predicts presumed consent. This is consistent with previous research that shows Catholicism generally relies on more hierarchical structures and is less likely to encourage social responsibility among its members. Last, higher pro-social behavior decreases the likelihood of presumed consent. This could be explained by policy-makers trying not to discourage donations where pro-social behavior is high by making it look a requirement rather than an altruistic act. The implications of the findings are discussed, with a particular focus on policy-switches in organ donations.

Keywords: Organ donation laws, presumed consent, legal origins, religion, altruism, regulation

JEL Classification: K32, I18, H8

Suggested Citation

Riambau, Guillem and Lai, Clin and Lu Zhao, Boyu and Liu, Jean, Legal Origins, Religion and Health Outcomes: A Cross-Country Comparison of Organ Donation Laws (June 5, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3218867 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3218867

Guillem Riambau (Contact Author)

Universitat de Barcelona ( email )

Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes, 585
Barcelona, 08007
Spain

University of Barcelona - Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) ( email )

c/ John M. Keynes, 1-11
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Clin Lai

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Yale-NUS College ( email )

Singapore

Boyu Lu Zhao

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Yale-NUS College ( email )

Singapore

Jean Liu

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Yale-NUS College ( email )

Singapore

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