Inconsistency’s Many Forms in Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Implications for Reform

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 2018

10 Pages Posted: 24 Aug 2020

See all articles by Lise Johnson

Lise Johnson

Columbia University - Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment

Lisa Sachs

Columbia University - Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment

Date Written: November 2018

Abstract

UNCITRAL has a vital role to play in exploring problems with and potential reform of ISDS, and in considering how to ensure its work better promotes, and does not undermine, rule of law, other domestic and international commitments and policies, and the globally agreed Agenda 2030. As the process moves forward, it is essential for the work to take a broad approach to defining the problem of “inconsistency” and designing reform solutions, as explored in this briefing note. Reform proposals regarding limiting shareholder claims, increasing states’ interpretive power, and avoiding inappropriate adjudicator incentives are undoubtedly positive signs that reflect earnest desire for change. But it is unclear that anything short of a reversion to state-to-state dispute settlement will minimize the risk of inconsistency across law and policy spheres.

Keywords: UNCITRAL, ISDS, Investor-State Dispute Settlement

Suggested Citation

Johnson, Lise and Sachs, Lisa, Inconsistency’s Many Forms in Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Implications for Reform (November 2018). Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3660920 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3660920

Lise Johnson

Columbia University - Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment

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Lisa Sachs (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment ( email )

William C. Warren Hall, 1st floor
410 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
(212) 854-0691 (Phone)

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