Psychological Pressure and the Right to Determine the Moves in Dynamic Tournaments – Evidence From a Natural Field Experiment

26 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2020 Last revised: 24 Feb 2021

See all articles by Mark Kassis

Mark Kassis

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Sascha L. Schmidt

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Dominik Schreyer

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 23, 2020

Abstract

In this paper, we show that the right to determine the sequence of moves in a dynamic team tournament improves the chances of winning the contest. Because studying dynamic team tournaments – like R&D races – with interim feedback is difficult with company data, we examine decisions of highly paid professionals in soccer penalty shootouts and show that teams whose captains can decide about the shooting sequence are more likely to win the shootout. So, managerial decisions matter for outcomes of dynamic tournaments and we discuss potential reasons for this finding.

Keywords: Dynamic tournament, sports professionals, psychological pressure, value of decision rights, penalty shoot-outs, behavioral economics

JEL Classification: C93, D00, D81, D91, Z20

Suggested Citation

Kassis, Mark and Schmidt, Sascha L. and Schreyer, Dominik and Sutter, Matthias, Psychological Pressure and the Right to Determine the Moves in Dynamic Tournaments – Evidence From a Natural Field Experiment (August 23, 2020). Games and Economic Behavior, 126, 278-287., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3679873 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3679873

Mark Kassis

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )

Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany

Sascha L. Schmidt

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany

Dominik Schreyer (Contact Author)

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )

Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

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