A Guilt-Free Strategy to Increase Self-Reported Non-Compliance with COVID-19 Preventive Measures: Experimental Evidence from 12 Countries

PLOS One, Forthcoming

37 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2020 Last revised: 29 Mar 2021

See all articles by Jean-François Daoust

Jean-François Daoust

University of Edinburgh

Eric Belanger

McGill University

Ruth Dassonneville

University of Montreal - Department of Political Science

Erick Lachapelle

University of Montreal

Richard Nadeau

University of Montreal - Department of Political Science

Michael Becher

IE University

Sylvain Brouard

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) - Center for Political Research (CEVIPOF)

Martial Foucault

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) - Center for Political Research (CEVIPOF)

Christoph Hönnige

University of Hanover

Daniel Stegmueller

Duke University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: March 29, 2021

Abstract

Studies of citizens’ compliance with COVID-19 preventive measures routinely rely on survey data. While essential, public health restrictions provide clear signals of what is socially desirable in this context, creating a potential source of response bias in self-reported measures of compliance. In this research, we examine whether the results of a guilt-free strategy that was used by Daoust et al. (2020) to loosen this constraint are generalizable across twelve countries, and whether the treatment effect varies across subgroups. Our findings show that the guilt-free strategy is a very useful tool in every country included, increasing respondents’ proclivity to report non-compliance by 9 to 16 percentage points. This effect holds for different subgroups based on gender, age and education. We conclude that the inclusion of this strategy should be the new standard for survey research that aims to provide crucial data on the current pandemic.

Keywords: COVID-19, Public health, Pandemic, Compliance, Measurement, Social desirability bias, Experimental method

JEL Classification: I12, I28, B40

Suggested Citation

Daoust, Jean-François and Belanger, Eric and Dassonneville, Ruth and Lachapelle, Erick and Nadeau, Richard and Becher, Michael and Brouard, Sylvain and Foucault, Martial and Hönnige, Christoph and Stegmueller, Daniel, A Guilt-Free Strategy to Increase Self-Reported Non-Compliance with COVID-19 Preventive Measures: Experimental Evidence from 12 Countries (March 29, 2021). PLOS One, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3686342 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3686342

Jean-François Daoust (Contact Author)

University of Edinburgh ( email )

Old College
South Bridge
Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9JY
United Kingdom

Eric Belanger

McGill University

Ruth Dassonneville

University of Montreal - Department of Political Science

Pavillon Lionel-Groulx
3150, rue Jean-Brillant
Montréal, Québec H3T 1N8
Canada

Erick Lachapelle

University of Montreal ( email )

C.P. 6128 succursale Centre-ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada

Richard Nadeau

University of Montreal - Department of Political Science

Pavillon Lionel-Groulx
3150, rue Jean-Brillant
Montréal, Québec H3T 1N8
Canada

Michael Becher

IE University ( email )

Paseo de la Castellana, 259
Madrid, 28046
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.ie.edu/university/about/faculty/michael-becher/

Sylvain Brouard

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) - Center for Political Research (CEVIPOF) ( email )

98 rue de l'Université
Paris, 75007
France

Martial Foucault

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) - Center for Political Research (CEVIPOF) ( email )

98 rue de l'Université
Paris, 75007
France

Christoph Hönnige

University of Hanover

Germany

Daniel Stegmueller

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.daniel-stegmueller.com

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