Monetary Policy at Work: Security and Credit Application Registers Evidence

78 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2017 Last revised: 10 Sep 2020

See all articles by José-Luis Peydró

José-Luis Peydró

Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

Andrea Polo

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Economics and Finance; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Enrico Sette

Bank of Italy

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 13, 2017

Abstract

Monetary policy transmission may be impaired if banks rebalance their portfolios towards securities. We identify the bank lending and risk-taking channels of monetary policy by exploiting – Italian’s unique – credit and security registers. In crisis times, with higher ECB liquidity, less capitalized banks react by increasing securities over credit supply, inducing worse firm-level real effects. However, they buy securities with lower yields and haircuts. Differently, in pre-crisis time, securities do not crowd-out credit supply. The substitution from lending to securities in crisis times helps less capitalized banks to repair their balance-sheets and then restart credit supply with a one year-lag.

Keywords: securities, credit supply, bank capital, monetary policy, reach-for-yield

JEL Classification: E51, E52, E58, G01, G21

Suggested Citation

Peydro, Jose-Luis and Polo, Andrea and Sette, Enrico, Monetary Policy at Work: Security and Credit Application Registers Evidence (October 13, 2017). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2958917 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2958917

Jose-Luis Peydro

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain
(+34) 93 542 1756 (Phone)
(+34) 93 542 1746 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/joseluispeydroswebpage/

Andrea Polo (Contact Author)

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Via Kennedy 6
Parma, 43100 - I
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Enrico Sette

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

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