Overzealous Rule Makers
42 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2020
Date Written: September 17, 2020
Abstract
Excessively tight and biased policy choices of rule makers can be explained as outcomes of competition among rule makers with over-lapping competencies and diverging perceptions about the optimal framework. Rule makers who have extreme rather than moderate preferences are more likely to take policy action and preempt others, even if their cost of action is very high. This can lead to actionism, excessive regulatory activity, and radical rule outcomes.
Keywords: rule-making competition, preemption, identity depen-dent externalities, extremism, regulatory thicket
JEL Classification: H11, K51
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Barbieri, Stefano and Konrad, Kai A., Overzealous Rule Makers (September 17, 2020). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3694373
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