The Effectiveness of European Antitrust Fines
48 Pages Posted: 3 Dec 2020
Date Written: November 13, 2020
Abstract
This paper examines the effectiveness of the administrative fines imposed by the European Commission on cartels from an economic perspective. It reviews the theory, practice, and evidence of optimal fines and assesses whether the European Commission fines, leniency, and settlement procedures deter and otherwise affect the actions of cartels.
Keywords: price-fixing, cartel, fines, recidivism, leniency, settlements, deterrence
JEL Classification: D4, K0, K21, L1, L4, L11, L12, L13, K14, L41, L44, N60
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Veljanovski, Cento, The Effectiveness of European Antitrust Fines (November 13, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3730361 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3730361
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.