Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible

23 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2021

See all articles by Steven J. Brams

Steven J. Brams

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

Marc Kilgour

Wilfrid Laurier University

Christian Klamler

University of Graz

Date Written: March 2021

Abstract

Assume two players, A and B, must divide a set of indivisible items that each strictly ranks from best to worst. If the number of items is even, assume that the players desire that the allocations be balanced (each player gets half the items), item-wise envy-free (EF), and Pareto-optimal (PO).

Meeting this ideal is frequently impossible. If so, we find a balanced maximal partial allocation of items to the players that is EF, though it may not be PO. Then we show how to augment it in a way that makes it a complete allocation that is EF for one player (say, A) and almost-EF for the other player (B) in the sense that it is EF for B except for one item – it would be EF for B if a specific item assigned to A were removed. Moreover, we show how low-ranked that exceptional item can be for B, thereby finding an almost-EF allocation that is as close as possible to EF – as well as complete, balanced, and PO. We provide algorithms to find such almost-EF allocations, adapted from algorithms that apply when complete balanced EF-PO allocations are possible.

Keywords: 2-person fair division, indivisible items, envy-freeness up to one item, Pareto-optimality

JEL Classification: C72, D61

Suggested Citation

Brams, Steven and Kilgour, Marc and Klamler, Christian, Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible (March 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3810746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3810746

Steven Brams (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

Dept. of Politics
19 West 4th St., 2nd Fl.
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-8510 (Phone)
212-995-4184 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/stevenbrams.html

Marc Kilgour

Wilfrid Laurier University

75 University Ave W
waterloo, ontario N2L 3C5
Canada

Christian Klamler

University of Graz ( email )

Graz
Austria

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