Hedging, Contract Enforceability and Competition

121 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2021 Last revised: 14 Dec 2023

See all articles by Erasmo Giambona

Erasmo Giambona

Syracuse University - Whitman School of Management - Finance Department; James D. Kuhn Center for Real Estate

Anil Kumar

Aarhus University - School of Business and Social Sciences; Danish Finance Institute

Gordon M. Phillips

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: October 14, 2021

Abstract

We study how risk management through hedging impacts firms and competition among firms in the life insurance industry - an industry with over 7 Trillion in assets and over 1,000 private and public firms. We examine firms after a staggered state-level reform that reduces the costs of hedging by granting derivatives superpriority in case of insolvency. We show that firms that are likely to face costly external finance increase hedging and reduce risk and the probability of receivership. Firms that are likely to face costly external finance, also lower prices, increase policy sales and increase their market share post reform.

Keywords: Competition, risk management, hedging, financial stability, policy sales (life insurance and annuities), policy prices, market share, market leadership, derivatives superpriority

JEL Classification: D02, D22, D43, G22, G28, G31, G32, G33

Suggested Citation

Giambona, Erasmo and Kumar, Anil and Phillips, Gordon M., Hedging, Contract Enforceability and Competition (October 14, 2021). Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 3802342, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3802342 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3802342

Erasmo Giambona

Syracuse University - Whitman School of Management - Finance Department; James D. Kuhn Center for Real Estate ( email )

721 University Avenue
RM 640
Syracuse, NY 13244-2450
United States
315 443-4885 (Phone)

Anil Kumar

Aarhus University - School of Business and Social Sciences ( email )

Fuglesangs Alle 4
Aarhus V, 8210
Denmark

Danish Finance Institute ( email )

Gordon M. Phillips (Contact Author)

Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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