Two Shades of Opacity: Hidden Orders versus Dark Trading

44 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2015 Last revised: 8 Jun 2021

See all articles by Hans Degryse

Hans Degryse

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB)

Nikolaos Karagiannis

The University of Manchester - Alliance Manchester Business School; KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB)

Geoffrey Tombeur

KU Leuven - University of Leuven

Gunther Wuyts

KU Leuven - University of Leuven

Date Written: June 25, 2018

Abstract

Regulators are concerned that large volumes of trading outside lit venues (i.e., dark
trading) harms the functioning of financial markets. In contrast, regulators are neutral about
hidden-order trading as these occur on lit venues and are associated with positive effects on
market quality. An unanswered economic question concerns the interrelation between these
two types of opaque trading, i.e., hidden orders and dark trading. Employing two different
empirical methodologies we find that dark and hidden-order trading are substitutes. We
also show that both types of opaque trading increase when markets are volatile and fewer
algorithmic trading occurs. Smart order routing increases dark trading but reduces hidden-
order activity.

Keywords: Dark Trading, Hidden Orders, Dark Pools, OTC Trading, Opacity, Transparency

JEL Classification: G10,G15

Suggested Citation

Degryse, Hans and Karagiannis, Nikolaos and Tombeur, Geoffrey and Wuyts, Gunther, Two Shades of Opacity: Hidden Orders versus Dark Trading (June 25, 2018). Journal of Financial Intermediation, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2669447 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2669447

Hans Degryse (Contact Author)

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Nikolaos Karagiannis

The University of Manchester - Alliance Manchester Business School ( email )

Booth Street West
Manchester, M15 6PB
United Kingdom

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Geoffrey Tombeur

KU Leuven - University of Leuven ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Gunther Wuyts

KU Leuven - University of Leuven ( email )

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics
Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, Vlaams-Brabant 3000
Belgium
+3216326731 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/gunther.wuyts

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