The Effects of Audit-Firm Monopolies within Local Audit Markets

62 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2018 Last revised: 18 Jun 2021

See all articles by Jaehan Ahn

Jaehan Ahn

Northeastern University - Accounting Group

Date Written: June 18, 2021

Abstract

This study identifies auditors who have 100% market shares in a city-industry audit market (hereinafter, monopolist auditors) and examines their pricing strategy. I document that monopolist auditors charge lower fees than do industry specialist auditors. This result is consistent with a monopolists’ pricing strategy (i.e., limit pricing) to deter new entrants but contrasts with regulators’ concerns about monopoly pricing. I further find that monopolist auditors more often fail to detect misstatements than do industry specialist auditors. This is consistent with regulators’ concerns about market-dominating auditors’ complacency. In cross-sectional tests, limit pricing is predominantly evident in homogenous operation industries where more profits are at stake. On the other hand, limit pricing is moderated when clients’ proprietary costs are high, which lowers auditor switching risk. In addition, I find that monopolist auditors’ audit failures are more pronounced when the current market competition within a city is low. These findings suggest that auditors exhibit distinctive incentives when they lack the closest competitor.

Keywords: Monopoly, Audit market concentration, Industry specialist, Audit fees, Misstatement, Limit pricing, Complacency

JEL Classification: M40, M42, D40, D42

Suggested Citation

Ahn, Jaehan, The Effects of Audit-Firm Monopolies within Local Audit Markets (June 18, 2021). Northeastern U. D’Amore-McKim School of Business Research Paper No. 3110936, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3110936 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3110936

Jaehan Ahn (Contact Author)

Northeastern University - Accounting Group ( email )

404 Hayden Hall
360 Huntington Ave.
Boston, MA 02115
United States

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