The Long-Term Effects of Capital Requirements

52 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 2021 Last revised: 6 Aug 2021

See all articles by Gianni De Nicolo

Gianni De Nicolo

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Nataliya Klimenko

University of Zurich

Sebastian Pfeil

University of Groningen

Jean-Charles Rochet

University of Toulouse Capitole - Toulouse School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 8, 2021

Abstract

We build a stylized dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions to analyze costs and benefits of capital requirements in the short-term and long-term. We show that since increasing capital requirements limits the aggregate loan supply, the equilibrium loan rate spread increases, which raises bank profitability and the market-to-book value of bank capital. Hence, banks build up larger capital buffers which (i) lowers the public losses in case of a systemic crisis and (ii) restores the banking sector’s lending capacity after the short-term credit crunch induced by tighter regulation. We confirm our model’s dynamic implications in a panel VAR estimation, which suggests that bank lending has even increased in the long-run after the implementation of Basel III capital regulation.

Keywords: Bank capital requirements, credit crunch, systemic risk

JEL Classification: E21, E32, F44, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

De Nicolo, Gianni and Klimenko, Nataliya and Pfeil, Sebastian and Rochet, Jean-Charles, The Long-Term Effects of Capital Requirements (March 8, 2021). Johns Hopkins Carey Business School Research Paper No. 21-03, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 21-52, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3865304 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3865304

Gianni De Nicolo (Contact Author)

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School ( email )

100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202
United States
(410) 234-4507 (Phone)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Nataliya Klimenko

University of Zurich ( email )

Plattenstrasse 32
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Sebastian Pfeil

University of Groningen ( email )

Postbus 72
9700 AB Groningen
Netherlands

Jean-Charles Rochet

University of Toulouse Capitole - Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

Toulouse
France

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