Social Media and Short Sellers

59 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2021 Last revised: 27 Apr 2023

See all articles by Guilong Cai

Guilong Cai

Sun Yat-sen University (SYSU)

R. David McLean

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business

Tianyu Zhang

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK)

Mengxin Zhao

Independent; Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

Date Written: June 29, 2022

Abstract

Social media could be used to correct mispricing, or exacerbate it. We find evidence of the latter effect. Social media tone exhibits a “pump-and-dump” pattern around short selling that is not explained by traditional media tone. The combination of pump-and-dump social media tone and short interest is associated with a pump-and-dump pattern in stock prices that is not explained by actual news. Using the firm-by-firm introduction and temporary suspension of short selling in China as natural experiments, we find that social media tone increases and becomes more intense when short selling is allowed, suggesting short sellers may play a role in social media manipulation. Manipulative social media tone is greater when there are more posts from active social media users, who are perhaps better able to influence other users. Our findings suggest that social media can enable stock price manipulation.

Keywords: short selling, social media, manipulation, arbitrage

JEL Classification: G02, G11, G12, G14, G18

Suggested Citation

Cai, Guilong and McLean, R. David and Zhang, Tianyu and Zhao, Mengxin and Zhao, Mengxin, Social Media and Short Sellers (June 29, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3907480 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3907480

Guilong Cai

Sun Yat-sen University (SYSU) ( email )

135, Xingang Xi Road
Haizhu District
Guangzhou, Guangdong 510275
China

R. David McLean (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business ( email )

3700 O Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057
United States

Tianyu Zhang

The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) ( email )

Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
Hong Kong

Mengxin Zhao

Independent

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ( email )

450 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20549-1105
United States

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