Mixed Ownership Reform and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence of Chinese Listed Firms

52 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2021

See all articles by Wei Wang

Wei Wang

Guangxi Normal University

Hua Wang

Zhongnan University of Economics and Law - School of Accounting

Ji (George) Wu

Massey University - School of Economics and Finance

Date Written: September 22, 2021

Abstract

We find a significant negative relationship between a firm’s mixed-ownership reform intensity ratio and the degree of corporate tax avoidance in China between 2003 and 2018. The path analyses demonstrate our finding is through the channel of a firm’s financial constraints and analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion. Furthermore, our main results are more pronounced for firms with a high level of media coverage and located in a region of weak tax enforcement or high willingness of government decentralisation. Finally, our results remain significant after alleviating a series of endogenous tests and robustness tests. We contribute to the literature to understand the causes of a firm’s tax avoidance behaviour and the consequence of the mixed-ownership reform in China.

Keywords: mixed-ownership reform intensity, corporate tax avoidance, State-Owned Enterprises, China.

Suggested Citation

Wang, Wei and Wang, Hua and Wu, Ji (George), Mixed Ownership Reform and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence of Chinese Listed Firms (September 22, 2021). Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 69, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3928446

Wei Wang

Guangxi Normal University ( email )

Guilin City, Guangxi 541004
China

Hua Wang (Contact Author)

Zhongnan University of Economics and Law - School of Accounting ( email )

182# Nanhu Avenue
Wuhan, 430073
China

Ji (George) Wu

Massey University - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

Private Bag 102904
North Shore
Auckland, Auckland 0745
New Zealand
+6292127089 (Phone)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
73
Abstract Views
364
Rank
585,302
PlumX Metrics